A call to abandon two basic beliefs of current Aristotle research No knowledge can be acquired without other knowledge that lies ahead of it. This primary knowledge can be of very different kind. The most basic knowledge is probably that about being (Sein). In reflection this can be uncovered and made explicit. History shows us that being was different at different epochs, in different worlds. However, there is also less fundamental knowledge, which is still prior to the acquisition of a concrete knowledge and which controls this acquisition. This applies not only to our everyday life, but also to scientific knowledge.What Thomas S. Kuhn called the paradigm is an example. Convictions that are shared by an entire community of scholars at a certain time belong to this type of prior knowledge. They are rarely or never reflected because they belong to the framework of scientific action. The scientific community itself ensures that these convictions are preserved. Nevertheless, there are also changes in this area, but only at longer intervals. However, these changes hardly ever come about through conscious or deliberate impetus, they happen or simply occur. After all, reflection can promote them. Also in contemporary Aristotle research there are such fundamental convictions. The first conviction is that Aristotle has developed a metaphysics of substance. One assumes that οὐσία is both correctly translated with substance and adequately reproduced in its content. On this point it must be said that the translation is simplywrong, substance translates ὑπόστασις, not οὐσία. But also in terms of content the Aristotelian οὐσία does not correspond to what one understands in the meantime, differently enough, by substance. The term emerges, after an early phase in the the Stoa, in the course of the reception above all in the Christian theological environment (questions of the Trinity, the nature of Christ and further). Augustine and Boethius have still considered variants for the translation of οὐσία. Finally, as Boethius reports in his Theological Treatises, the ecclesiasticus usus loquendi decided for the translation with substantia. And this is still the case today. However, the incorrectness of the translation and the understanding has recently been pointed out, but then for lack of better, one sticks to it. A second firm conviction is that Aristotle represented a theology with a first or unmoving mover as God. The error of translation is even worse, more obvious and of even greater significance than the first. Nowhere in the Corpus Aristotelicum there is to be found an expression in this masculine form, the corresponding expression, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν is always neutral. Τὸ κινοῦν is nothing other than one of four points in a heuristic list to find reasons. The fact that now the first moving one is asked is the result of the fact that the philosopher has to ask everywhere for the first one, not only for the first moving one, but also for the first for-the-sake-of, for the first What is that? etc. The masculine translation is based on the fact that God was understood by the first moving cause at certain times, and that God was, at those times, masculine. Not even a serious commentator like D. Ross has avoided that false translation. I. Düring has drawn attention to the error in the fifties, without any success. In his contribution to the Handbuch (Rapp and Corcilius, 2011), Bordt confirms the incorrectness and then, precisely because of the habit, he returns to the traditional translation. Even Thomas Aquinas was more cautious, who did not consistently use the masculine form, but often also the neutral one. Even those who reject or consider unlikely a theological interpretation of Lambda retain the masculine expression (see the literature on Lambda published after my commentary, 2008, e. g. Rapp/Corcilius, 2011; Fazzo, 2012; Alexandru, 2014; Baghdassarian, 2019; Judson, 2019). But, there may be still many scholars who, for whatever reason, want to stay with the wrong translations. Then it would be appropriate to state the reasons for this approach. Another point that is hardly ever noticed is a special type of term used by Aristotle (W.Wieland has spoken about it; this type of term is formed after some examples in Plato's Sophist), I have called it 'quotation' Anführung (Sonderegger, 1991 / 2012). It has far-reaching consequences in terms of content if one observes or not this type of concept. One has become accustomed to replace the expressions – it is the majority of terms for causes and for categories – 'the forthe-sake-of,' 'the out-of-what,' 'the What is that?' etc. with the Latinized substantive form as the end, the matter, the essence. The quotations are actually quotations from colloquial language. They are therefore not terms that claim anything, but expressions that remind the reader of something that he himself knows and masters from his own linguistic practice (certainly Aristotle now and then uses substantive substitutions, but their meaning is always derived from the quotations). The most eloquent example of this is τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. This expression has repeatedly been perceived as mysterious or cryptic, but it is formed with the core of the colloquial question τουτί τί ἦν; which often appears in the Aristophane comedies in the part with iambic dialogue, the model example of the Attic dialect. The attempt to replace the derivation of the expression from the Attic colloquial language with another Weidemann made (1996) fails to follow the rules of Greek language. This type of term allows Aristotle, given place, to make reflections without having to claim anything himself. It allows him to execute the 'unassertive thinking.' This is particularly important in carrying out reflections on the very first basis of our thinking and knowledge, the 2 question of being. In my commentaries onMetaphysics Lambda (Lang, 2008; English revised edition in progress) andMetaphysics Zeta (Königshausen & Neumann, 2012) the background to these questions is explained in detail. However, the arguments presented there are not discussed in the Handbuch (Rapp and Corcilius, 2011), in the New Essays (Horn, 2016), or in the commentaries on metaphysics that have appeared in the meantime. 'Substance' and 'Unmoved Mover' remain intact entirely. Many scholars agree that the first sentence of Metaphysics Lambda is a title, a program or a summary. That is certainly correct. But, while the standard interpretation reads the sentence as a program of an existing theory about the substance it might make more sense to read it as a program for a question, for the question that has been raised in Plato's Sophist, the question after being (Frage nach dem Sein). The corrected English version of my introduction, translation and commentary toMetaphysics Lambda (published in German 2008) that will be ready shortly (as I hope 2020) could provide an opportunity to address these and many other arguments that are not considered in current literature. The arguments are both philosophical and philological and based on the text itself and its historical background. Asking the 'question of being' instead of an unsuitable substance metaphysics and a badly founded theology – would that not be an alternative worth considering? Translated from German with the help of www.DeepL.com/Translator